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ARTICLES
FOUR LESSONS FROM WAL-MART v. DUKES
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO MONTANA
CLASS ACTION LAW
Robert H. King, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A class action is a departure from the usual rule that litigation is con-
ducted by and on behalf of the named parties only.1  In a class action, one
or more named plaintiffs are permitted to represent a class of other individ-
uals possessing the same interest and same injury.2  To protect the interests
of those other, absent individuals, both federal and state rules of civil proce-
dure impose certain requirements for certifying actions as class actions.
The 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23(a) and (b), governing class ac-
tions, significantly altered the requirements for maintenance of class ac-
tions.3  Those amendments were copied into many states’ rules of civil pro-
cedure, including Montana’s.4  Those amendments led to a virtual explosion
in class litigation over the past 40 years.5  Despite the volume of class ac-
* B.A. Dartmouth College 1975 magna cum laude; J.D. University of Michigan Law School
1978 magna cum laude.  Admitted to practice: Montana (2011), California (1989) (currently inactive),
and Illinois (1978).  Mr. King is a partner in the firm of SNR Denton US LLP in its Chicago, Illinois
office and has been engaged in class action defense nationwide for over thirty years.  Other lawyers in
SNR Denton on occasion do legal work for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Mr. King has never personally repre-
sented Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.  The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of SNR Denton, its lawyers, or its past or present clients.
1. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–701 (1979).
2. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
3. See discussion, infra part II.
4. See Mont. R. Civ. P. 23.
5. See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 Miss.
C. L. Rev. 323, 345–346 (2005).  National concern regarding the perceived expanded misuse of the
1
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tion decisions in the lower courts in both the state and federal systems, the
United States Supreme Court has issued only slightly more than a handful
of decisions touching upon the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).6  Thus, a
United States Supreme Court decision providing guidance on the meaning
of Rule 23 is significant, and warrants special attention.
In June 2011, the Court issued a landmark decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Incorporated  v. Dukes,7 reversing the certification of a nationwide
class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart em-
ployees who alleged sexual discrimination under Title VII.8  A 5–4 major-
ity of the Court held that the proposed class failed to satisfy the “common-
ality” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), finding that
the case presented no significant common question of fact or law that was
capable of being answered on a class-wide basis.9  The Court also held
unanimously that the class should not have been certified under Rule
23(b)(2) because the plaintiffs sought individualized monetary relief in the
form of back pay.10
Several significant clarifications to federal class action law emerge
from the Wal-Mart decision.  Prior to Wal-Mart, it was a common mantra
that courts could not take into consideration the merits of the underlying
claims in ruling on class certification.11  The Wal-Mart majority clarified
that Rule 23’s requirements are not a mere pleading standard, and the pro-
ponent of class certification must prove compliance with the rule, even if
that overlaps with a merits issue.  Before Wal-Mart, Rule 23(a)(2)’s “com-
monality” requirement had been characterized as a mere technical formality
easily satisfied.12  The Wal-Mart majority established a new, more stringent
test for determining commonality that gives teeth to that requirement.  Prior
to Wal-Mart, courts had interpreted Rule 23(b)(2) to extend beyond injunc-
tive or declaratory relief to other forms of “equitable” relief, and had de-
vised various tests for allowing monetary recovery in Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions if such recovery did not “predominate” or was “incidental” to de-
class action device—particularly in state courts—induced Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness
Act (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)), which, among other things, permits removal of most major class actions to
federal court. See Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 4–5 (2010).
6. See e.g. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., 431
U.S. 395; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Califano, 442 U.S. 682; Gen. Tel. Co. of
N.W. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980); Gen. Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997);
Oritz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
7. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) [hereinafter Wal-Mart].
8. Id. at 2544.
9. Id. at 2546, 2555.
10. Id. at 2561.
11. See infra part IV(a)(1).
12. See infra part IV(b)(1).
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claratory or injunctive relief.13  The Wal-Mart Court unanimously held that
Rule 23(b)(2)’s explicit language restricts its application to claims for in-
junctive or declaratory relief, and that classes cannot be certified under this
section for the recovery of individualized monetary relief.  Prior to Wal-
Mart, lower courts had suggested that class monetary awards could be pred-
icated upon formulas or sampling approaches.14  However, the Wal-Mart
Court rejected an approach to awarding class-wide damages based upon
random samples or extrapolations if such an approach would deprive de-
fendants of the right to raise individual challenges to class member recov-
eries.
The Wal-Mart decision will have an important impact on the future
development of federal class action practice.  This article posits that the
Wal-Mart decision should similarly have a large impact on the development
of Montana class action law.  Montana’s Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
(b) set forth the requirements for certification of class action claims in Mon-
tana state court.  The language of Montana Rule 23(a) and (b) is identical to
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b), and the Comment to the
Montana Rule makes clear that it was intended to follow the federal exam-
ple.15  Montana courts have traditionally found federal caselaw “instruc-
tive” in interpreting Montana’s version of the Rule.16  In its first post-Wal-
Mart class certification opinion, the Montana Supreme Court cited with ap-
proval Wal-Mart’s holding pertaining to the impropriety of individualized
monetary awards in a Rule 23(b)(2) class, but the Court failed to apply this
holding appropriately to the case before it or to appreciate the significance
of the remainder of the Wal-Mart decision.17  Montana law thus has yet to
fully embrace or understand the lessons to be learned from Wal-Mart.
This article will first discuss the history of the class action device and
the evolution of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  It will then review the
reasoning of the lower court opinions in the Wal-Mart case that led to the
United States Supreme Court’s decision, which will help place the Wal-
Mart decision in context.  It will then examine four lessons to be gleaned
from the Wal-Mart decision and explain how and why they should be ap-
plied in the further development of Montana class action law.
13. See infra part IV(c)(1).
14. See infra part IV(d)(1).
15. See Mont. R. Civ. P. 23 comm. nn. (2011) (explaining that recent changes were made in part to
the Montana Rule “to conform to the recent changes in the Federal Rules.”); see also Mont. Sup. Ct. Or.,
In Re Revs. to the Mont. R. of Civ. P., No. AF 07-0157 (Apr. 26, 2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2011).
16. McDonald v. Washington, 862 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Mont. 1993); Sieglock v. Burlington N. Santa
Fe R.R. Co., 81 P.3d 495, 497 (Mont. 2003).
17. See Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., 267 P.3d 756, 765 (Mont. 2011).
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II. HISTORY OF THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE AND THE EVOLUTION OF
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23
Class actions originally were a creature of the English Chancery
courts.  Under English practice, a class action could be maintained if there
was a common interest, joinder of all class members was impracticable, and
the class was adequately represented.18  In the United States, the class ac-
tion was initially governed in the federal courts by Equity Rule 38 which
provided that “[w]hen the question is one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole.”19  As its name implied, the application of this rule was limited to
actions brought in equity; it did not apply to actions at law for money dam-
ages.20
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated,
which, among other things mandated one form of action, making the rules
applicable to both equity and legal claims.21  Rule 23 essentially incorpo-
rated the requirements of Equity Rule 38, but also created three different
types of class actions: “true” class actions, in which the rights sought to be
enforced were “joint or common or secondary”; “hybrid” class actions, in
which the rights were several and related to identifiable property; and
“spurious” class actions, in which the rights sought to be enforced were
several, but encompassing a common question of law or fact forming the
basis for common relief.22  The spurious class became the principal vehicle
for assertion of money damage claims on behalf of a class.  A judgment in a
spurious class action did not bind absent class members.  Some courts held
that class members of a spurious class could sit back and await the outcome
of the suit, and “opt-in” to the action if the judgment were favorable to
them; this was known as “one-way intervention.”23
Federal Rule 23 underwent substantial amendment in 1966.  Amended
Rules 23(a)(1)–(4) were thought to essentially carry forward the former
rule’s requirements and were not thought to be controversial.24  Rule
23(a)(1)–(4) sets forth the “prerequisites” for class certification:
18. See Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding The Small Claimant, 10 B.C. L. Rev. 501,
502 (1969).
19. See James Love Hopkins, The New Federal Equity Rules, 231 (W.H. Anderson, Co. 1930).
20. Ford, supra n. 18, at 502.
21. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (1938).
22. See Advisory Committee Notes to Former Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. app. at 6102; Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(1)–(3), 28 U.S.C. app. at 6101.
23. See e.g. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587–590 (10th Cir. 1961).
24. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 387 (1967) (requirements of Rule 23(a) de-
scribed as a “well-agreed proposition.”).
4
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One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.25
The 1966 amendments replaced the 1938 class action categories with
Rule 23(b)’s three new types of class action.  The former “hybrid” class
action was replaced by amended Rule 23(b)(1), which provided for certifi-
cation if prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class mem-
bers would create a risk of inconsistent or varying judgments with respect
to individual class members that “would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class” or which would, as a practical
matter “be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.”26
The former “true” class action was replaced by amended Rule
23(b)(2), which permitted class actions when “final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”
because “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class.”27  Civil rights cases against parties
charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination were considered to be
the “prime examples” of the amended Rule 23(b)(2) class.28
The former “spurious” class action was replaced by Rule 23(b)(3),
which allowed classes if questions of law or fact common to class members
“predominates over any questions affecting only individual members,” and
a class action was superior to other methods for adjudicating the contro-
versy.29  Pursuant to amended Rule 23(c)(2), a certified Rule 23(b)(3) class
must receive notice and be given an opportunity to opt-out of the action
before resolution on the merits.30  If a Rule 23(b)(3) class member did not
exercise his right to opt-out of the class, any judgment entered would be
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4) (1966).
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) (1966); See also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614 (“Rule 23(b)(1)(A) ‘takes in
cases where the party is obliged by law to treat the members of the class alike (a utility acting toward
customers; a government imposing a tax), or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical
necessity (a riparian owner using water as against downriver owners.)).  Rule 23(b)(1)(B) includes, for
example, ‘limited fund’ cases, instances in which numerous persons make claims against a fund insuffi-
cient to satisfy all claims.”) (internal citations omitted).
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (1966).
28. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–2558.
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (1966).  Rule 23(b)(3) was thought to the “‘most adventuresome’
innovation,” and was “[f]ramed for situations in which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called
for’ as it is in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations . . . .” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614–615 (internal citations
omitted).
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (1966).
5
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binding upon him.31  Thus amended, Rule 23 eliminated the “one-way in-
tervention” previously permitted under the spurious class-action category.
There were additional amendments to Rule 23 in 1998, and 2003, but
none of these amendments altered the basic provisions of Rule 23(a) and
(b).32  As one commentator has noted, “[t]hough Rule 23 was never in-
tended nor designed to handle a wide array of class actions, lawyers and
courts began to push the envelope, using the class-action device in novel
ways and new circumstances.”33  What should have been Rule 23(b)(3) ac-
tions for money damages were being filed as Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) actions
for tactical reasons, to bind absent class members or to avoid the costs asso-
ciated with providing notice to the class.34  Thus, it was not entirely surpris-
ing that eventually such envelope-pushing would spawn a mammoth nation-
wide class like the 1.5 million-member one certified by the district court in
Wal-Mart.
III. BACKGROUND ON THE WAL-MART DECISION
a. Nature of the Action
On June 8, 2001, six women who had worked for Wal-Mart or Sam’s
Club, either as hourly or salaried workers in several different Wal-Mart or
Sam’s Club stores in California or other states, brought suit under Title VII
against Wal-Mart.35  The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart sexually discrimi-
nated against them by paying them less than men in comparable positions,
awarding them fewer promotions to in-store management compared to men,
and forcing them to wait longer than their male counterparts to advance.36
Although Wal-Mart had a formal, written company policy that forbade gen-
der discrimination,37 the plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart allowed individ-
ual store managers to use their own subjective decision-making process in
both hiring and promotion decisions.38  Such a subjective decision-making
process, it was argued, made Wal-Mart’s corporate culture “vulnerable” to
sexual stereotyping and discrimination.39  The named plaintiffs sought in-
junctive relief, back pay, and punitive damages on behalf of themselves and
31. Id.
32. See Rabiej, supra n. 5, at 324, 348–390.
33. Id. at 345–346.
34. Id. at 346.
35. See Def.’s Opposition to Mot. for Class Certification, 17–18 n. 9, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2003).
36. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
37. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (“Wal-Mart’s announced policy forbids sex discrimination . . .
and as the District Court recognized the company imposes penalties for denials of equal employment
opportunity.”).
38. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145.
39. Id. at 145, 154.
6
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a class of current and former Wal-Mart female employees from December
26, 1998 to the present, estimated to number more than 1.5 million mem-
bers.40  Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages for themselves, but they
did not seek traditional compensatory damages on behalf of the class.41
b. The District Court’s Certification Decision
In an 84 page order, the district court granted in part and denied in part
plaintiffs’ motion to certify.  Regarding the plaintiffs’ claim for equal pay,
the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and the proposed class was
certified with respect to issues of liability and all forms of requested relief,
including punitive damages.  As for the plaintiffs’ promotion claim, the mo-
tion was granted in part and denied part.  The district court certified the
proposed class with respect to issues of liability (including liability for pu-
nitive damages) and injunctive and declaratory relief, but the court found
that in regard to the remedy of back pay, such a class would be “managea-
ble only with respect to those challenged promotions where objective data
is available to document class member interest in the challenged promo-
tion.”42
In reaching its decision, the district court held that the plaintiffs had
satisfied their burden of showing “commonality” under Rule 23(a)(2).43
The district court observed that commonality does not require all questions
of law or fact to be common: “one significant issue common to the class
may be sufficient to warrant certification.”44  The district court noted that
the “necessary showing to satisfy commonality is ‘minimal.’”45  Plaintiffs
relied upon three types of evidence to establish commonality: statistical,46
40. Id. at 141–142.
41. Id. at 141.
42. Id. at 143.
43. Id. at 166.
44. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145.
45. Id. (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)).  Relying upon
Hanlon, the district court also stated that commonality could be satisfied by “showing that class mem-
bers shared legal issues but divergent facts or that they share a common core of facts but base their
claims for relief on different legal theories.”  As discussed below, infra part IV(c), the continuing vital-
ity of that line of reasoning is suspect as a result of the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart opinion.
46. Plaintiffs’ experts presented “descriptive statistics which show that women working in Wal-
Mart stores are paid less than men in every region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, that
the salary gap widens over time . . . that women take longer to enter into management positions and that
the higher one looks in the organization the lower the percentage of women.” Id. at 155.  Separate
regression analysis was conducted that showed “statistically significant gender-based disparities for all
in-store classifications in all 41 Wal-Mart regions.” Id. at 156.  Wal-Mart submitted its own statistical
experts who rejected the focus at the regional level, and ran their own regression analysis at the depart-
ment/individual store level that showed “a lack of broad-based gender differential in pay for hourly
employees, although they show some gender disparities in limited instances.” Id.
7
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sociological,47 and anecdotal.48  The district court concluded that plaintiffs’
evidence “raises an inference that Wal-Mart engages in discriminatory prac-
tices,” exceeding “the permissive and minimal burden of establishing com-
monality.”49  Wal-Mart’s objections to plaintiffs’ evidence were deemed
“insufficient to defeat Plaintiffs’ showing of commonality; rather, the ob-
jections [were] predominately of the type that go to the weight of the evi-
dence, and thus should properly be addressed by a jury considering the mer-
its.”50
The district court expressly rejected Wal-Mart’s contention that plain-
tiffs’ expert testimony was required to pass muster under a Daubert51 analy-
sis, holding instead that so long as the expert’s opinion was not “so flawed
that it lacks sufficient probative value to be considered,” it was sufficient
for class certification purposes.52  The district court’s adoption of this “test”
for consideration of expert testimony at the class certification stage appears
to have been driven, in part, by its understanding of the Supreme Court’s
1974 opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.53  Citing Eisen, the district
court stated that “arguments on the merits are improper at this stage of the
proceedings.”54  From this premise, the district court concluded that “courts
should avoid resolving ‘the battle of the experts,’” and indeed “should not
even apply the full Daubert ‘gatekeeper’ standard at this stage.”55
The district court had little trouble concluding that a Rule 23(b)(2)
class for injunctive and declaratory relief was appropriate because
47. Plaintiffs’ expert sociologist testified that Wal-Mart’s “‘strong and widely shared organiza-
tional culture promotes uniformity of practices throughout an organization,’” and that gender stereotyp-
ing was “likely” to exist at Wal-Mart because “gender stereotypes are especially likely to influence
personnel decisions when they are based on subjective factors, because substantial decision-maker dis-
cretion tends to allow people to ‘seek out and retain stereotyping-confirming information and ignore or
minimize information that defies stereotypes.’” Id. at 151, 153 (citations omitted).  This expert could
not, however, “determine with any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in em-
ployment decisions at Wal-Mart,” and conceded “that he could not calculate whether 0.5 percent or 95
percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped thinking.” Id. at
189, 192.
48. Plaintiffs submitted declarations from each of the class representatives and 114 putative class
members from around the country testifying “to being paid less than similarly situated men, being de-
nied promotion or being delayed in promotion in a disproportionate manner compared with similarly
situated men, working in an atmosphere with a strong corporate culture, and being subjected to various
individual sexist acts.” Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 165.
49. Id. at 166.
50. Id. Wal-Mart had moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ evidence, which was denied. See
id. at 189.
51. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 192.
53. Eisen, 417 U.S. 156.
54. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 191 (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177).
55. Id.  As discussed infra part IV(a)(1), Eisen had generated similar confusion about what courts
could or should consider in determining compliance with Rule 23’s requirements, which the Wal-Mart
majority clarified.
8
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“[p]laintiffs allege that Wal-Mart has acted or refused to act . . . on grounds
generally applicable to the proposed class . . . .”56  The district court also
had little problem with the concept of certifying a (b)(2) class for back pay
because “it is well established that lost pay is recoverable as an equitable
make-whole remedy in employment class actions notwithstanding its mone-
tary nature.”57  However, the propriety of certifying a class under Rule
23(b)(2) for punitive damages raised larger analytic hurdles.58
Relying upon prevailing Ninth Circuit law governing the recovery of
monetary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) actions, the district court held that the pro-
posed (b)(2) class “can include claims for monetary damages so long as
such damages are not the ‘predominant’ relief sought, but instead are ‘sec-
ondary to the primary claim for injunctive or declaratory relief.’”59  In ap-
plying this “predominance” test, the district court attempted to determine
the plaintiffs’ intent in bringing the suit.60  The district court found that the
“equitable relief sought predominates over the claim for punitive damages”
because the injunctive relief sought “would achieve very significant long-
term relief,” the “recovery of lost pay for all injured class members would
result in additional substantial equitable relief to the class,” and the named
class representatives affirmed in declarations that “their central motivation
for participating in this action is to improve opportunities for women at
Wal-Mart.”61  However, recognizing the Due Process concerns that could
arise with the individual recovery of punitive damages, the district court
directed that notice be sent to the class and class members be given an
opportunity to “opt-out” of the punitive damage class.62  Although such no-
tice and opt-out procedures are not encompassed by the actual text of Rule
23(b)(2) or consistent with its purpose, the district court noted that there
was ample authority for such an exercise of the court’s discretion.63
56. Id. at 170.
57. Id. (citing Gotthardt v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1152–1155 (9th Cir. 1999);
Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Salinas v. Roadway Express, 735 F.2d 1574,
1576 (5th Cir. 1984)).
58. If the Wal-Mart plaintiffs had been pursuing standard Montana state law tort claims on behalf
of the class, their failure to seek compensatory damages for the class would have been fatal to their
attempt to certify a punitive damages claim because “without an award of compensatory damages, there
can be no award of punitive damages.” Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 215 P.3d 649, 664 (Mont. 2009);
see also Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27–1–220(1), 27–1–221(1), 27–1–221(5).  However, Title VII specifi-
cally provides that plaintiffs can seek punitive damages under that statute without seeking or recovering
traditional compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); Hennessy v. Penril DataComm Net-
works, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995).
59. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170 (quoting Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2003)).
60. Id. (quoting Molski, 318 F.3d at 950).
61. Id. at 171.
62. Id. at 173.
63. Id. (citing In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2004) (“district courts
have discretion to order notice and opt-out rights when certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class”); Robinson v.
9
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The district court also engaged in another detour from Rule 23(b)(2)’s
text when it performed a “manageability” analysis, finding such a require-
ment implicit in any type of class certification.64  Wal-Mart argued that the
size of the putative class itself made the case unmanageable, but the district
court concluded that the size alone did not preclude class treatment.65  The
district court observed that the standard approach to Title VII class actions
was to bifurcate the adjudication into two stages: liability and remedy.66
The district court concluded that the liability stage of the trial would not
present manageability concerns because “once the court determines that
there are sufficient common questions to justify proceeding as a class, the
liability phase properly focuses on evidence that affects the class gener-
ally—not on individuals or other minor segments of the class.”67  While
Wal-Mart would be entitled to introduce evidence challenging the alleged
nationwide pattern and practice, “[i]t is not, however, entitled to circumvent
or defeat the class nature of the proceeding by litigating whether every indi-
vidual store discriminated against individual class members.”68
The district court also concluded that the remedy stage did not present
insurmountable manageability problems, even though Wal-Mart did not
contend that injunctive relief would present manageability problems.  The
district court concluded that the back pay remedy for the equal pay class
would be manageable and could be accomplished by using objective com-
pany records and then comparing pay for men and women in comparable
positions.69  With regard to the promotion class, the district court was confi-
dent that a formulaic approach for calculating a lump-sum back pay liability
to the class could be developed in a manageable manner, at least for a lim-
ited segment of the class.70  The district court observed that in promotion
formula cases, there are usually additional proceedings to determine
whether class members were both eligible and interested in the promotion,
but plaintiffs had conceded that such additional proceedings would be un-
manageable in this case.71  The district court concluded that objective data
from Wal-Mart eliminated the need for individualized hearings with respect
to the eligibility component and that, therefore, the portion of the promo-
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 165–166 (2d Cir. 2001) (notice and opt out can be afforded
Rule 23(b)(2) class members with respect to non-incidental damage claims); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l
Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898–899 (7th Cir. 1999) (same)).
64. Id.
65. Dukes, 222 F.R.D at 173.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 183.
70. Id. at 178–179.
71. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 179–180.
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tion-class back pay analysis would be manageable.72  But there was no such
objective data with regard to whether class members had interest in a partic-
ular promotion.  The district court thus concluded that back pay could not
be reasonably managed on a class basis for promotions that were not
posted; only where promotional opportunities were posted could class
members that had expressed an interest be identified.73  The district court
restricted certification of the promotion class accordingly.
c. The Ninth Circuit Opinions
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), Wal-Mart appealed
the district court’s class certification to the Ninth Circuit, and the plaintiffs
cross-appealed the district court’s limitation of their proposed promotion
back pay class.  In a 2–1 decision, a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision, although it further limited the class to individuals
who were Wal-Mart employees on June 8, 2001 when the lawsuit was filed
because former employees lacked standing to pursue claims for the declara-
tory or injunctive relief sought by the class.74
With regard to commonality, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Rule
23(a)(2) had been construed permissively and concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that commonality was satisfied
by plaintiffs’ evidence.75  Applying Ninth Circuit precedent on the question
of the availability of monetary relief for back pay and punitive damages in a
Rule 23(b)(2) class, the court was satisfied that even without the possibility
of a back pay recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain
the injunctive relief sought.76  The Ninth Circuit majority did agree with
Wal-Mart that putative class members who were no longer Wal-Mart em-
ployees at the time plaintiffs’ complaint was filed did not have standing to
pursue injunctive or declaratory relief and therefore remanded to the district
court for a determination of the appropriate scope of the class.77
Wal-Mart petitioned the Ninth Circuit for re-hearing en banc, and
plaintiffs cross-petitioned for re-hearing en banc.  The Ninth Circuit granted
the parties’ petitions, and a deeply divided 6–5 court affirmed the district
court’s certification order, with certain modifications.78  The Ninth Circuit
en banc majority agreed with the district court that Rule 23(a)(2) has been
“‘construed permissively,’” and held that “[p]laintiffs’ factual evidence, ex-
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id. at 182.
74. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
75. Id. at 1177–1178.
76. Id. at 1187–1188 (quoting Molski, 318 F.3d at 950).
77. Id. at 1189.
78. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
11
King: Four Lessons From Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Their Application to Montana Class Action Law
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 12 24-OCT-12 9:19
266 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 73
pert opinions, statistical evidence, and anecdotal evidence provide sufficient
support to raise the common question whether Wal-Mart’s female employ-
ees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate policies (not
merely a number of independent discriminatory acts) that may have worked
to unlawfully discriminate against them in violation of Title VII.”79
As to whether it was appropriate to certify a class seeking back pay
under Rule 23(b)(2), the Ninth Circuit en banc majority observed that “[a]n
interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) that prevented any claim for monetary relief
would render . . . redundant or irrelevant”80 the advisory committee’s note
to Rule 23 that (b)(2) classes did “not extend to cases in which the appropri-
ate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages.”81
The Ninth Circuit en banc majority decided to adopt a new test based upon
the dictionary definition of “predominate”: “[t]o be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) . . . a class must seek only monetary damages that are not ‘superior
[in] strength, influence, or authority’ to injunctive and declaratory relief.”82
Under this new test, the en banc majority held that the district court’s
decision to include claims for back pay in the Rule 23(b)(2) class was not
an abuse of discretion, but the district court had abused its discretion by
failing to analyze whether certifying plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims
caused monetary damages to predominate.83  The en banc majority re-
manded the punitive damage issue to the district court to determine whether
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) would cause punitive damages to
“predominate” and, if so, to consider whether a “hybrid certification” of the
(b)(2) class along with a (b)(3) class for punitive damages would be appro-
priate.84  The majority opinion also agreed with Wal-Mart that putative
class members who did not work for Wal-Mart as of the time of the filing of
the lawsuit lacked standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief, and
thus were not proper members of the (b)(2) class.85
The en banc majority also considered the question of manageability
and it agreed with the district court’s limitation of the promotion back-pay
class to posted promotions where objective evidence of class member inter-
est was available.86  The en banc majority further observed:
At this stage, we express no opinion regarding Wal-Mart’s objections to the
district court’s tentative trial plan (or that trial plan itself), but simply note
that, because there are a range of possibilities—which may or may not in-
79. Id. at 612, 615.
80. Id. at 615–616.
81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory comm. nn. (1966); Dukes, 603 F.3d at 615–616.
82. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 616.
83. Id. at 617.
84. Id. at 622.
85. Id. at 623.
86. Id. at 615.
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clude the district court’s proposed course of action—that would allow this
class action to proceed in a manner that is both manageable and in accordance
with due process, manageability concerns present no bar to class certification
here.87
The en banc majority pointed to the Hilao v. Estate of Marcos88 deci-
sion as an example of a possible formulaic approach to class-wide damages
that could provide a model to be followed with the Wal-Mart class.  In
Hilao, the Ninth Circuit had affirmed a Rule 23(b)(3) class-action judgment
that had been rendered based upon a random sample of 137 out of 9,541
claims chosen and reviewed by a special master.  Based upon that review,
the special master recommended that an award to the class be determined
by multiplying the number of valid claims in the sample (131) by the aver-
age award recommended for the valid claims.89
The special master’s report and the testimony from the 137 sample
claimants were introduced at a jury trial on compensatory damages.  The
jury was instructed that it could (a) accept, modify or reject the special
master’s recommendations, or (b) reach its own judgment, based upon the
results of the random sample, as to the actual damages of those claimants
and of the aggregate damages suffered by the class as a whole.90  The en
banc majority observed that “[b]ecause we see no reason why a similar
procedure to that used in Hilao could not be employed in this case, we
conclude that there exists at least one method of managing this large class
action that, albeit somewhat imperfect, nonetheless protects the due process
rights of all involved parties.”91
d. The Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari
Wal-Mart petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.  Wal-Mart requested the Court to review two questions:
I. Whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)—which by its terms is limited to injunctive or
corresponding declaratory relief—and if so, under what circumstances;
and
II. Whether the certification order conforms to the requirements of Title VII,
the Due Process Clause, the Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.92
87. Id. at 625.
88. Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
89. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 626.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 627.
92. Pet. Writ of Cert., *i, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).
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The Supreme Court granted Wal-Mart’s petition, but only as to Ques-
tion I.93  The Court on its own initiative, however, added a second question
for consideration: “[w]hether the class certification ordered under rule
23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).”94
IV. FOUR LESSONS FROM WAL-MART
This article focuses upon four lessons to be learned from the Supreme
Court’s reversal of class certification in Wal-Mart, and the extent to which
Montana law should embrace such lessons.  First, the majority opinion
swept away some forty years of reliance by the lower courts on dicta in
Eisen that class certification was not to involve inquiry into the merits of
the suit, making clear that Rule 23’s requirements may require a court to
make determinations of issues that overlap with the merits.  For the most
part, Montana law seems to have anticipated this development, and requires
a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements, even if they overlap with
merits issues.
Second, the Wal-Mart majority clarified that Rule 23(a)(2)’s “com-
monality requirement” was not satisfied by the mere identification of “com-
mon questions,” but rather required questions that could generate common
answers that would “resolve an issue central to the validity of each” class
member’s claim “in one stroke.”  In its post-Wal-Mart decisions, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has not appeared to appreciate Wal-Mart’s clarification
of the “commonality” standard, and it will be argued that it should do so.
Third, the unanimous Wal-Mart Court clarified that Rule 23(b)(2) only
authorizes certification of claims for injunctive or corresponding declara-
tory relief, not for other forms of equitable relief  or individualized mone-
tary awards.  Although the Montana Supreme Court has paid lip-service to
this holding, the application of the holding will require further refinement
by the Court in future cases.
93. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).
94. Id.  It is not entirely clear from reading the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision what the pur-
pose for this addition was, unless it was a signal that the Justices, or some of them, wanted to address the
commonality requirement.  Wal-Mart had not sought certiorari of the Ninth Circuit’s commonality hold-
ing, and as pointed out infra part IV(b)(3), there was no court of appeals circuit split on Rule 23(a)(2)’s
requirement that would have justified granting certiorari on that ground.  Other than the Court’s discus-
sion of the commonality requirement, there is nothing else in the Wal-Mart decision that discusses Rule
23(a), and at least the majority’s discussion of the commonality requirement is not tied to its “consis-
tency” with Rule 23(b)(2) (although the dissent suggests that majority’s new test is not consistent with
Rule 23(b)(2), see infra part IV(b)(4)).  While the Court did not grant certiorari with regard to the
petition’s second question, a portion of the unanimous Court’s opinion did address whether the certifica-
tion order conformed to the requirements of Title VII and the Rules Enabling Act. See Wal-Mart, 131 S.
Ct. at 2560–2561; see also infra part IV(d)(3).
14
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Finally, the unanimous Wal-Mart Court confirmed that the procedural
class action device cannot be used to preclude a defendant’s right to raise
individual defenses on both liability and damages to individual class mem-
ber’s claims.  Specifically, the Wal-Mart Court rejected the notion of a
“Trial by Formula” approach to class actions that would prevent a defen-
dant from raising defenses to individual class members’ right to recover
damages.  This issue has not yet been squarely presented to the Montana
Supreme Court, but it will be argued that Montana constitutional concerns
regarding both due process and separation of powers should compel a simi-
lar conclusion.
a. Lesson 1: Courts Must Determine that Each of Rule 23’s
Requirements Have Been Proven, Even if that Analysis
Overlaps with the Merits
1. The Pre-Wal-Mart Reluctance to Resolve Disputed Issues of Fact
that Touched on the Merits for Class Certification Purposes
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court found in Eisen that “nothing
in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority
to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to deter-
mine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”95  Eight years later,
in General Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon,96 the Court ob-
served in dictum that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe
behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.”
Reconciling these seemingly divergent commands had created a measure of
confusion among the federal courts as to what a court could, or should,
consider in determining whether to certify a class.  Some courts read Eisen
expansively to mean that no inquiry touching the merits of the underlying
claims was permissible at all at the class-certification stage and that the
allegations of the complaint had to be accepted as true for certification pur-
poses.97  Other courts read Eisen somewhat less expansively to mean that
courts could not consider competing evidence (beyond the pleadings) when
the dispute overlapped with the merits.98
The en banc Ninth Circuit majority in Wal-Mart reviewed more recent
decisions and concluded that the “core holding across circuits” required dis-
95. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
96. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
97. See e.g. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs. Inc., 199 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (“since the
class determination is made at the pleading stage of the action, the substantive allegations in the com-
plaint are accepted as true for purposes of the class motion.”), rev’d, 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001).
98. See e.g. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001);
Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1999).
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trict courts to determine Rule 23 compliance “before certifying a class,
which will sometimes, though not always, require an inquiry into and pre-
liminary resolution of disputed factual issues, even if those same factual
issues are also independently relevant to the ultimate merits of the case.”99
Other courts had disagreed that there was such a concrete consensus.100
The disagreement was understandable given that the interplay between the
Eisen and Falcon directives had not been expressly addressed by the Su-
preme Court before Wal-Mart.
The Wal-Mart district court opinion itself reflected the tension be-
tween Eisen and Falcon.  The district court recognized that it must conduct
a “rigorous analysis” to determine compliance with Rule 23, including go-
ing behind the pleadings.101  But the district court repeatedly genuflected
toward the Eisen “no merits inquiry” concept.102  As shown above, this led
to the district court’s refusal to resolve the “dueling experts” issues that
touched on the merits or to perform the Daubert gate-keeping function.103
Ironically, this approach also led to the application of essentially a
merits-based standard for certification of the class—an inverse summary
judgment standard.  If a Rule 23 requirement overlapped with a merits is-
sue, certification was appropriate, in the district court’s view, so long as
plaintiffs came forward with enough evidence to raise a factual question
99. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 583 (emphasis added).
100. For example, the First Circuit had observed that “[its] sister circuits agree that when class
criteria and merits overlap, the district court must conduct a searching inquiry regarding the Rule 23
criteria, but how they articulate the necessary degree of inquiry ranges along a spectrum which suggests
substantial differences.” In re New Motor Veh. Canadian Export Antitrust Litg., 522 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir.
2008).  The First Circuit believed that requiring district courts to “make specific findings that each Rule
23 criterion is met” was at “the more rigorous end of [the] spectrum” and followed by the Second,
Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Id.  By contrast, according to the First Circuit, “the Third and Eighth
Circuits sometimes require an inquiry into and preliminary resolution of disputes, but they do not require
findings and do not hold that such inquiry will always be necessary.” Id.
101. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143.
102. For example, the district court observed that while “‘the class determination generally involves
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of
action.’  Nevertheless, ‘[the United States Supreme Court] find[s] nothing in either the language or
history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.’” Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 144
(quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177) (internal citations omitted).  The district court
further cited to Caridad without parenthetical explanation; however the page cited to in the Caridad
decision contains the statement that “a motion for class certification is not an occasion for examination
of the merits of the case.” Caridad, 191 F.3d at 291.  As the Ninth Circuit en banc majority opinion
acknowledged, the Caridad decision was representative of a view that class certification was proper
based on “‘some showing’ that the Rule 23 factors were met, obviating the need to assess conflicting
expert testimony pertinent to the Rule 23 inquiries.” Dukes, 603 F.3d at 583.  The Second Circuit
affirmatively repudiated such a standard in In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d
Cir. 2006).
103. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154–155 nn. 19–22.
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with regard to the Rule 23 requirement.104  It would then be left for the jury
to decide whether the Rule 23 merits requirement was in fact proven at
trial.105  For example, in Wal-Mart, Rule 23’s commonality requirement
overlapped with the merits issue of whether Wal-Mart had a company-wide
pattern and practice of discriminating against women.  The Ninth Circuit en
banc majority essentially endorsed the district court’s approach, stating that
“[t]he disagreement is the common question, and deciding which side has
been more persuasive is an issue for the next phase of the litigation.”106
2. The Wal-Mart Majority Clarifies that District Courts Must Look
Behind the Pleadings and Determine Whether Plaintiffs Have
Proven Compliance with Rule 23’s Requirements, Even if it
Overlaps with the Merits
The Wal-Mart majority clarified that Eisen represents no bar to the
consideration of the merits of the underlying claim if necessary to assess
whether Rule 23’s requirements have been satisfied.  It also made clear that
evidence—as opposed to mere allegations—is necessary for a plaintiff to
establish compliance with Rule 23’s requirements, and the district court
104. Id. at 144.  The district court cited with approval Nelson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675,
670–680 (11th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that plaintiffs’ burden at class certification “entails more
than the simple assertion of [commonality and typicality] but less than a prima facie showing of liabil-
ity.” Id.
105. See e.g. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154 (“Whether [Dr. Bielby’s] opinions, if presented to a jury, are
ultimately worthy of belief will be for a jury to decide.  For present purposes, Dr. Bielby’s testimony
raises an inference of corporate uniformity and gender stereotyping that is common to all class mem-
bers.”); id. at 155 (“the Court delves into the substance of the expert testimony only to the extent
necessary to determine if it is sufficiently probative of an inference of discrimination to create a com-
mon question as to the existence of a pattern and practice of gender discrimination.”); id. at 159 (“The
ultimate question of whether subjective decision-making and a uniform culture contribute to a nation-
wide pattern of gender discrimination will, of course, be for a jury to decide.  At this stage, however,
these factors are apparent enough to support Dr. Drogin’s regional approach as at least a reasonable
means of conducting a statistical analysis.”); id. at 166 (“Together, this evidence raises an inference that
Wal-Mart engages in discriminatory practices . . . the objections [to this evidence] are predominately of
the type that go to the weight of the evidence, and thus should properly be addressed by a jury consider-
ing the merits.”).
106. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 609; see also id. at 587 (“[I]t is the plaintiff’s theory that matters at the class
certification stage, not whether the theory will ultimately succeed on the merits.”); id. at 590 (“[T]he
district court’s inquiry at [the class certification] stage remains focused on . . . common questions of law
or fact under Rule 23(a)(2), not the proof of answers to those questions or the likelihood of success on
the merits.”); id. at 594 (“[W]hat must be satisfied for the commonality inquiry . . . is that plaintiffs
establish common questions of law and fact, and answering those questions is the purpose of the merits
inquiry, which can be addressed at trial and at summary judgment.”); id. at 603 (“At the class certifica-
tion stage, it is enough that [plaintiffs’ expert sociologist] presented scientifically reliable evidence tend-
ing to show that a common question of fact—i.e., ‘Does Wal-Mart’s policy of decentralized subjective
employment decision making operate to discriminate against female employees?’—exists with respect
to all members of the class.”).
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must actually decide that the Rule 23 requirement has been proven, even if
that requirement overlaps with a merits issue.
Although the Court in Falcon recognized that “sometimes it may be
necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest
on the certification question,” the Wal-Mart majority declared that
“[f]requently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the mer-
its of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.”107  There was nothing unusual about
that consequence in the Wal-Mart majority’s view because “touching as-
pects of the merits in order to resolve [other] preliminary matters, e.g., ju-
risdiction and venue, is a familiar feature of litigation.”108
As the Wal-Mart majority explained, Eisen was not to the contrary
because there,
the judge had conducted a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit, not in
order to determine the propriety of certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) . . .
but in order to shift the cost of notice required by Rule 23(c)(2) from the
plaintiff to the defendants.  To the extent the quoted statement goes beyond
the permissibility of a merits inquiry for any other purpose, it is the purest
dictum and is contradicted by our other cases.109
The Wal-Mart majority also made clear that “Rule 23 does not set
forth a mere pleading standard.”110  A party seeking class certification must
affirmatively demonstrate compliance with the rule—in other words, that
“there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or
fact, etc.”111  The Wal-Mart majority’s analysis of plaintiffs’ inability “to
prove” satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement strongly
suggests that the evidence proffered must be admissible evidence.  The
Wal-Mart majority found that plaintiff’s sociological expert’s testimony
was both not credible and perhaps inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 and Daubert.112  The Court eluded to the importance of basing
class certification decisions upon admissible evidence by noting that, while
the district court had concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testi-
mony at the class-certification stage,113 “[w]e doubt that is so . . . .”114
Requiring admissible evidence to substantiate compliance with Rule 23’s
requirements would be consistent with requirements for similar preliminary
107. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphases added).
108. Id. at 2552 (citing Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676–677).
109. Id. n. 6.
110. Id. at 2551.
111. Id. (emphasis in original).
112. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
113. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 191.
114. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
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findings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(2), which
the Wal-Mart majority found to be analogous.115
Insistence that the proponent of class certification “prove” compliance
with Rule 23’s requirements implies a corollary obligation upon the district
court to actually “find” compliance by resolving, if necessary, competing
factual assertions based upon the evidence presented.116  In other words, if
plaintiffs’ theory of commonality was that there was a company-wide pat-
tern and practice of discrimination, to certify a class the district court must
find that such a company-wide policy actually exists by a preponderance of
the evidence, even though the plaintiffs will have to prove that fact again at
trial to prevail on the merits.  As one commentator addressing the Ninth
Circuit en banc majority’s opinion explained:
Class certification asks whether there is reason to think it more likely than not
that the company-wide discrimination policy at the heart of [the case] actually
exists.  Only then are the individual instances of adverse employment actions
as to pay and promotion connected together as instantiations of the same un-
derlying wrong.117
115. See e.g. Gold River, LLC v. La Jolla Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142561, *5 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2011) (“where jurisdiction is specifically challenged . . . Gold River has the
burden to demonstrate with admissible evidence that this court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over
its claims.”); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986) (“When a defendant moves to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff ‘is obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or
otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.’”); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (“The necessity of touch-
ing aspects of the merits in order to resolve preliminary matters, e.g., jurisdiction and venue, is a familiar
feature of litigation.”).
116. Pre-Wal-Mart courts had struggled in finding the proper terminology to describe the degree of
inquiry that was to be applied at the class certification stage.  Some courts had said that the district court
was to make “findings” that the Rule 23 requirements had been satisfied. See e.g. Unger v. Amedisys
Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 319–320 (5th Cir. 2005).  Others had stated that district courts must “determine” that
the Rule 23 requirements were met. See e.g. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 40–44; In
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008).  Another formulation was that
district courts were required to “resolve” whether the Rule 23 requirements were met. See e.g. Blades v.
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566–567 (8th Cir. 2005).  Although the Ninth Circuit en banc majority
viewed these formulations as a matter of semantics rather than substance, the terminology used matters
because it may imply a different appellate standard of review. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 585.  A district
court’s “findings” of fact are usually reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard. See In re Initial
Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41.  The Second Circuit’s resolution of this issue makes the most
sense: a district court’s “determination” that Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied is a mixed question of
law and fact, involving three separate appellate review standards: (1) clearly erroneous, to the extent that
the determination is based upon a finding of fact, (2) de novo for review of the district court’s articula-
tion of the legal standard governing each requirement, and (3) abuse of discretion for review of the
ultimate ruling that applied the correct legal standard to the facts as found by the district court. Id.  The
Wal-Mart majority did not directly address this issue, but by requiring the proponent of class certifica-
tion “to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”
strongly suggested that the In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig. reasoning is sound. Wal-Mart, 131 S.
Ct. at 2551 (emphasis in original).
117. Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc
149, 162 (2010).
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The Wal-Mart majority’s analysis of whether plaintiffs met their bur-
den of proving commonality illustrates what the federal district courts are
now required to do.  Plaintiffs could prove a Title VII pattern and practice
case either by showing that the employer used a biased testing procedure, or
by providing “significant proof” that Wal-Mart operated under a general
policy of discrimination.  Wal-Mart had no testing procedure for hiring or
promotions, so the first avenue of proof was unavailable.  The Wal-Mart
majority found that plaintiffs had provided “no convincing proof” of a dis-
criminatory company-wide pay and promotion policy.118
To arrive at this conclusion, the Wal-Mart majority carefully scruti-
nized plaintiffs’ sociological, statistical, and anecdotal evidence and ex-
pressly found none of it sufficient to establish a company-wide policy of
discrimination.119  The only evidence of a general policy of discrimination
that plaintiffs produced was Dr. Bielby’s testimony that Wal-Mart had a
corporate culture that makes it “vulnerable” to gender bias.120  But the Wal-
Mart majority found that this testimony was inadequate because Dr. Bielby
conceded that he could not calculate whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of
the employment decisions at Wal-Mart were determined by stereotyped
thinking.  But the Court found that it was precisely such a determination
that was at the heart of plaintiffs’ theory of commonality.121  For the Wal-
Mart majority, “[i]f Bielby admittedly has no answer to the question, we
can safely disregard what he has to say.”122
Nor did Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence prove commonality because it
was predicated upon supposed regional pay disparities which could be at-
tributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart stores, and did not by itself estab-
lish the uniform, store-by-store disparity.123  Because merely proving that a
discretionary system has produced a racial or sexual disparity is not enough
to establish a Title VII violation, the plaintiff is required to identify the
specific employment practice that is challenged.124  The Wal-Mart majority
found that “[o]ther than the bare existence of delegated discretion, respon-
dents have identified no ‘specific employment practice’—much less one
that ties all their 1.5 million claims together.”125
Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence was found to suffer from similar defects
and to be “too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, discretion-
118. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
119. Id. at 2555.
120. Id. at 2553 (internal quotations omitted).
121. Id. at 2554.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2555.
124. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2255 (quoting Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988)).
125. Id. at 2255–2256.
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ary personnel decisions are discriminatory.”126  Plaintiffs filed some 120
affidavits reporting instances of alleged discrimination, or “about 1 for
every 12,500 class members—relating to only some 235 out of Wal-Mart’s
3,400 stores.”127  But even if every single one of the affidavits was true, the
Wal-Mart majority was unconvinced that such evidence would demonstrate
that the entire company “‘operate[s] under a general policy of discrimina-
tion’ . . . which is what respondents must show to certify a companywide
class.”128
The Wal-Mart majority thus found for class-certification purposes that
plaintiffs had not proven that Wal-Mart had a company-wide pattern and
practice of discrimination.  That issue was at the heart of the merits of the
case.  Still, the Court evaluated the evidence and found that plaintiffs’ proof
was lacking, making class certification improper.129
3. Application of the Wal-Mart Majority’s Analysis to Montana Class
Action Practice
With regard to the propriety of looking behind the pleadings and re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove—rather than merely allege—compliance with
Rule 23’s requirements, the Wal-Mart majority is essentially in accord with
current Montana law.  In August 2009, the Montana Supreme Court clari-
fied the standards to be applied at the class-certification stage in Mattson v.
Montana Power Company,130 a decision that in many ways anticipated the
Wal-Mart majority’s pronouncement.
Mattson involved an action brought by a group of landowners owning
real property on the shores of Flathead Lake and Flathead River on behalf
of themselves and a class of similarly situated landowners against Montana
Power Company (“MPC”) and PPL Montana, LLC (“PPL”).  The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants had operated the Kerr Dam in a manner that had
126. Id. at 2556.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. In affirming, in part, the district court’s class certification order, the Ninth Circuit en banc
majority noted the highly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard that has traditionally limited the
scope of appellate review. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 579.  The Wal-Mart dissent also observed that “[a]bsent
an error of law or an abuse of discretion, an appellate tribunal has no warrant to upset the District
Court’s finding of commonality.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The words
“abuse of discretion” do not appear at all in the Wal-Mart majority opinion on commonality, and in light
of the penetrating review of the evidence engaged in by the Wal-Mart majority to find that plaintiffs had
failed to establish commonality, a fair question arises as to whether the Wal-Mart majority was sub
silencio announcing a new, stricter standard of appellate review.  This seems unlikely, because the Wal-
Mart majority essentially held that the district court had applied the wrong legal standard regarding
commonality.  It is well-established that a court abuses its discretion if its decision is premised upon a
legal error. See e.g. Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2001).
130. Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 215 P.3d 675 (Mont. 2009).
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caused erosion, loss of shoreline, and damage to their properties.131  A mo-
tion to certify a class against MPC was granted by the district court.132
Sometime thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class against
PPL, asserting that the district court’s prior ruling applied with equal force
to PPL.133
PPL responded that the motion lacked evidentiary support and asked
the district court to stay ruling on the motion until further discovery had
been completed.134  PPL also requested an evidentiary hearing on the mo-
tion.135  The district court denied the request to stay and the request for an
evidentiary hearing, noting that PPL had filed a brief and affidavit in oppo-
sition to the motion, and the court could not “imagine what counsel could
better present at an evidentiary hearing upon this relatively narrow issue
. . . .”  Thereafter in a separate order, the district court, citing Eisen, granted
class certification noting that a court “is not allowed to engage in analysis
of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims in order to determine whether a class
action may be maintained” and that it was “required to take the Plaintiffs’
allegations in support of the class action as true.”136
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order grant-
ing class certification as to PPL and remanded the matter for further pro-
ceedings.137  The Court held that district courts were not to “take the Plain-
tiffs’ allegations in support of the class action as true” and were instead to
allow discovery and hear evidence in order to answer “whatever factual and
legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.”138  In arriving at its conclu-
sion, the Court expressly adopted the guidelines for addressing class certifi-
cation set forth in Miles v. Merrill Lynch and Company,139 which include:
(1) a district judge may certify a class only after making determinations that
each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met; (2) such determinations can
be made only if the judge resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23
requirement and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a Rule 23
requirement have been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the rele-
vant facts and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met; (3)
the obligation to make such determinations is not lessened by overlap be-
tween a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue, even a merits issue that is
identical with a Rule 23 requirement; (4) in making such determinations, a
district judge should not assess any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23
requirement; and (5) a district judge has ample discretion to circumscribe both
131. Id. at 679.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 692.
134. Id. at 692–693.
135. Id.
136. Mattson, 215 P.3d at 693 (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id. at 695.
138. Id. at 694–695.
139. In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
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the extent of discovery concerning Rule 23 requirements and the extent of a
hearing to determine whether such requirements are met in order to assure
that a class certification motion does not become a pretext for a partial trial of
the merits.140
Measured against these guidelines, the Court found that the district court
had erred in concluding that it was required to take the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions as true, and vacated the order granting class certification as to PPL.141
The Mattson Court’s statement that the district court should “hear evi-
dence” at least implies evidence that is admissible under the Montana Rules
of Evidence.  Montana Rule of Evidence 101(a) provides that “[t]hese rules
govern all proceedings in all courts in the state of Montana with the excep-
tions stated in this rule.”142  Class certification proceedings are not among
the exceptions listed.143  Although not directly addressed by the Mattson
Court, presumably the Court would agree that the plaintiff seeking class
certification has the burden of establishing each Rule 23 requirement by a
preponderance of the evidence, as this is the standard endorsed by most
federal courts.144
However, in its first post-Wal-Mart class-certification decision, the
Montana Supreme Court in Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mon-
tana,145 seems to have slipped back into the same sort of confused under-
standing of Eisen that plagued courts prior to Wal-Mart.  In Diaz, state em-
ployees, who had been injured in automobile accidents, sued the State and
the administrators of its healthcare benefit plan alleging that the State sys-
tematically violated their “made-whole” rights by failing to conduct a
made-whole analysis before exercising subrogation rights.146  Plaintiffs
sought to certify a class of individuals who had their benefits reduced under
140. Mattson, 215 P.3d at 695 (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41).
141. Id.
142. Mont. R. Evid. 101(a).
143. Id. at 101(c) lists the following exceptions: “(1) preliminary questions of fact.  The determina-
tion of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by
the court under Rule 104(a).  (2) Grand jury.  Proceedings before grand juries.  (3) Miscellaneous pro-
ceedings.  Proceedings for extradition or rendition; preliminary examinations and proceedings on appli-
cations for leave to file information in criminal cases; sentencing; dispositional hearings in youth court
proceedings; granting or revoking probation or parole; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal sum-
monses and notices to appear, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise.  (4) Summary proceedings.  Proceedings, other than motions for summary judgment, where
the court is authorized by law to act summarily.  (5) Other miscellaneous proceedings.  Ex parte matters;
and proceedings, when authorized by law, which are uncontested or nonadversary.”
144. See e.g. In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41; Novella v. Westchester Co. N.Y.
Carpenters’ Pen. Fund, 661 F.3d 128, 148–149 (2d Cir. 2011).
145. Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., 267 P.3d 756 (Mont. 2011).
146. Id. at 760.  Montana public policy generally requires that an insured must be totally reimbursed
for all losses as well as costs, including attorney fees, involved in recovering those losses before the
insurer can exercise any right of subrogation, regardless of contract language to the contrary. See e.g.
Swanson v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 46 P.3d 584 (Mont. 2002).
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the State plan.147  The district court refused to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class
because it determined that individualized made-whole assessments were re-
quired in each case.148
In reversing the district court’s order, the Montana Supreme Court
seemed to adopt the Wal-Mart holding that individualized awards of mone-
tary relief were not proper in a Rule 23(b)(2) class, but Wal-Mart’s pro-
nouncement regarding the necessity of making factual determinations that
may overlap with the merits if necessary to determine compliance with Rule
23 did not appear to resonate with the Court.  The Court criticized the dis-
trict court’s assessment that individualized “made-whole” determinations
would be required as an improper “delv[ing] into the merits.”149  The Mon-
tana Supreme Court seemed to recognize that inquiry into a Rule 23 re-
quirement could overlap with a merits question when it acknowledged that
“[i]n determining whether to certify a class, ‘a district [court] should not
assess any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement.’”150  But
the Court, citing Eisen, then appeared to make an about-face by declaring
that “the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a
cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the require-
ments of Rule 23 are met.”151 The Court concluded:
The District Court, in determining that individualized made-whole determina-
tions were necessary here, erroneously delved into the merits of Diaz and
Hoffmann-Bernhardt’s claim.  In doing so, the District Court failed to recog-
nize that there is no prerequisite for individualized, fact-specific determina-
tions.  The primary issue is whether the State’s act of exercising its exclusion
before conducting a made-whole analysis violates Montana’s subrogation
laws.152
This analysis is not consistent with Wal-Mart. It was argued in Wal-
Mart that the primary issue was whether Wal-Mart had engaged in sexual
discrimination.  But that did not alter the fact that individualized back pay
determinations would still have to be made, even if discrimination was
proven.  Examining the nature of the claim pleaded to determine what must
be proven for the plaintiffs to obtain the relief requested is not “delving into
the merits,” but rather determining whether Rule 23(a)(2)’s and Rule
23(b)(2)’s requirements are met.
In Diaz, the district court was confronted with a complaint that, as
Justice Rice observed in his dissent, plainly called for individualized deter-
minations; as the Diaz plaintiffs themselves characterized it, the requested
147. Diaz, 267 P.3d at 760
148. Id. at 756, 763, 766.
149. Id. at 766.
150. Id. (quoting Mattson, 215 P.3d at 695).
151. Id. (quoting Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178).
152. Id.
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injunctive relief would “compel the defendants to calculate the amount un-
lawfully withheld from each individual member of the class and then to pay
that amount to the individual members of the class.”153  Faced with such
requested relief, the district court acted properly in refusing to certify the
Rule 23(b)(2) class because the requested relief necessitated individualized
determinations of monetary relief.  Observing that individualized determi-
nations were required did not determine the “merits” of any class member’s
claim for improperly withheld benefits.  It simply recognized that such
claims existed and the individualized determinations that would be required
to prove them, making Rule 23(b)(2) class certification improper.
Thus, while the Montana Supreme Court has clearly understood and
adopted Wal-Mart’s directive that the courts delve behind the pleadings in
determining compliance with Rule 23, it has not yet fully embraced Wal-
Mart’s lesson that courts should not shy away from determining Rule 23
issues that may overlap with the merits.  While, as shown above, the issue
in Diaz in reality did not involve such overlap, if it had, Wal-Mart teaches
that the district court should nonetheless determine actual compliance with
Rule 23 in ruling upon class certification.
b. Lesson 2: Commonality Under Rule 23(a)(2) Turns on Whether a
Common Question Central to the Validity of Each Class
Member’s Claim Can be Answered
on a Class-Wide Basis
1. The Status of Pre-Wal-Mart Law
Rule 23(a)(2) provides that certification of a class is appropriate “only
if . . . there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”154  There is
essentially no drafting history regarding the intent of Rule 23(a)(2), appar-
ently because the drafters believed that the provisions of Rule 23(a) were
obvious and non-controversial.155  Commentators and courts had been left
to construe Rule 23(a)(2) with limited guidance from the United States Su-
preme Court until the Wal-Mart decision.  In keeping with the then-current
view of the commonality requirement, the Wal-Mart district court charac-
terized the “common question” requirement as “permissive” and “mini-
mal”156 because all that was required was a single common question of law
153. Diaz, 267 P.3d at 769 (Rice, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
154. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
155. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 387 (1967) (requirements of Rule 23(a) de-
scribed as a “well agreed proposition.”).
156. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145, 166 (quoting Hanlon,150 F.3d at 1020).
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or fact to satisfy the rule.157  The Ninth Circuit en banc majority confirmed
that the requirement was “permissive.”158
The Montana Supreme Court adopted this “permissive application” of
the commonality requirement in McDonald v. Washington.159  In McDon-
ald, twenty-four named plaintiffs brought a putative class action against the
Butte Water Company (“BWC”) alleging that they were injured by the
company’s failure to provide adequate water and service.160  The alleged
injuries ranged from health problems associated with drinking tap water to
increased costs for purchasing bottled water in lieu of drinking the allegedly
tainted tap water.161  The Silver Bow County District Court certified a class,
and BWC pursued an interlocutory appeal to the Montana Supreme
Court.162  BWC argued that commonality had not been demonstrated be-
cause customers lived in different areas of Butte and their water sources
may have been different from other class members, and customers “suffered
varying health effects from varying amounts of BWC water usage . . . so
that the injuries suffered from one putative plaintiff to another are so differ-
ent that there are not sufficient questions of law or fact common to the
class.”163  The Montana Supreme Court rejected this argument, quoting
with approval from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jordan v. County of Los
Angeles as follows:
Rule 23(a)(2) does not require that every question of law or fact be common
to every member of the class.  The commonality requirement is satisfied
“where the question of law linking the class members is substantially related
to the resolution of the litigation even though the individuals are not identi-
cally situated”. . . . Courts that have analyzed Rule 23(a)(2) have generally
given it a permissive application in a variety of substantive law areas so that
the commonality requirement is usually found to be satisfied.164
Thus, pre-Wal-Mart, Montana class action law was in line with federal
authority in requiring a minimal showing to satisfy the commonality re-
quirement.
157. See e.g. James W.M. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice vol. 5, § 23.23[2], 23–72 (3d ed.,
Matthew Bender 2011) (stating that the Rule 23(a)(2) inquiry was “easily satisfied.”).
158. Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1177.
159. McDonald, 862 P.2d at 1155.
160. Id. at 1152.
161. Id. at 1151.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1155.
164. Id. (quoting Jordan v. Co. of L.A., 669 F.2d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)).
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2. “Commonality” Requires Analysis of Whether a Significant Question
Can Be Answered on a Class-wide Basis
One of the most significant aspects of the Wal-Mart decision is that it
breathes new life into the commonality requirement, departing from the
prior “minimalist” approach.  The Wal-Mart majority stated that the com-
monality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) “is easy to misread since ‘[a]ny com-
petently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions,’”165 in-
cluding, in the context of the Wal-Mart case, “do our managers have discre-
tion over pay?  Is that an unlawful employment practice?”  But Wal-Mart
makes clear that “[r]eciting these questions is not sufficient to obtain class
certification.”166  Something more substantive is required to satisfy the Rule
23(a)(2) requirement.  “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demon-
strate”—not just allege—“that the class members ‘have suffered the same
injury’. . . .  This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a viola-
tion of the same provision of law.”167
The Wal-Mart majority explained “[q]uite obviously, the mere claim
by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII
injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe
that all their claims can productively be litigated at once.”168  To satisfy the
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement:
Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for example, the as-
sertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.  That com-
mon contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-
wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.
. . .
What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common “ques-
tions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.  Dis-
similarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede
the generation of common answers.169
165. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra n. 117, at 131–132).
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S.at 157).  Some federal appellate courts had similarly recognized
that any group of generalized allegations might be labeled as common or typical, but should be deemed
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a).  For example, the Sixth Circuit had warned “at a sufficiently
abstract level of generalization, almost any set of claims can be said to display commonality.  What we
are looking for is a common issue the resolution of which will advance the litigation.” Sprague v. Gen.
Motor Co., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  To like effect is the Fifth Circuit’s observation
that commonality and typicality should not be satisfied by “lifting the description of the claims to a level
of generality that tears them from their substantively required moorings to actual causation and discrete
injury.” In re Fiberboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990).
168. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
169. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Nagareda, supra n. 117, at 132).
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As applied to the Wal-Mart case, “proof of commonality necessarily
overlapp[ed] with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engage[d]
in a pattern or practice of discrimination” because “the crux of the inquiry
is ‘the reason for a particular employment decision.’”170  “Without some
glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be
impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I
disfavored.”171  As shown in the preceding section, because the Wal-Mart
plaintiffs had been unable to come forward with “significant” or “convinc-
ing proof” that Wal-Mart operated under a company-wide policy of dis-
crimination, they had failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality require-
ment.
3. The Wal-Mart Dissent’s Critique of the Majority’s New Commonality
Requirement
The Wal-Mart dissent took issue with the majority’s formulation of
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement on two basic grounds.  First, as a
matter of linguistics, the Rule spoke of “questions of law or fact common to
the class”—not common answers.172  A “question” is ordinarily understood
to be ‘[a] subject or point open to controversy,’” so “a ‘question’ ‘common
to the class’ must be a dispute, either of fact or of law, the resolution of
which will advance the determination of the class members’ claims.”173
Second, the dissent maintained that by focusing on dissimilarities within the
proposed class, the majority had blended “Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold crite-
rion with the more demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3).”174  An emphasis
on differences between class members, the dissent argued, mimics the Rule
23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions predominate over individual
issues, meaning that “no mission remains for Rule 23(b)(3).”175  The dis-
sent contended that the Court’s “dissimilarities” position was far reaching
because Rule 23(a)(2) was a prerequisite for Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) clas-
ses as well.  “Individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule
23(b)(2) class, so long as the Rule 23(a) threshold is met.”176
170. Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S.
867, 876 (1984)).
171. Id. (emphasis in original).
172. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2562 (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
173. Id
174. Id. at 2565.
175. Id. at 2566.
176. Id. The dissent’s suggestion that individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(2) class so
long as Rule 23(a)(2) has been satisfied ignored well-settled precedent that Rule 23(b)(2) rests on an
“assumption of cohesiveness” within the class. Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1156 (11th
28
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4. Application of the New Commonality Requirement to Montana Class
Action Law
The Wal-Mart majority’s holding with regard to Rule 23(a)(2)’s com-
monality requirement is at odds with the Montana Supreme Court’s prior
“permissive application” to commonality.  But the Montana Supreme Court
did not adopt such an approach based upon anything idiosyncratic to Mon-
tana Rule 23.  To the contrary, it adopted the approach because it was the
prevailing approach under Federal Rule 23 at the time.  Now that there is
definitive guidance from the United States Supreme Court, the prior “per-
missive application” of Rule 23(a)(2) should be abandoned.
The question arises, however, whether the Montana Supreme Court’s
most recent decision in Diaz represents a rejection of the Wal-Mart major-
ity’s commonality holding.  In Diaz, the Montana Supreme Court cited with
approval Wal-Mart’s holding that individualized monetary awards were not
appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2)’s certification.177  But when addressing Rule
23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, the Court completely ignored the
Wal-Mart majority’s holding on commonality, stating instead that
“[c]ommonality is not a ‘stringent threshold and does not impose an un-
wieldy burden on plaintiffs. . . .  [A]ll that is necessary . . . is an allegation
of a standardized, uniform course of conduct by defendants affecting plain-
tiffs.’”178  Although the Diaz district court had determined that commonal-
ity was not satisfied because individualized made-whole assessments were
required, the Montana Supreme Court held that “the class members here
share a common issue of fact and/or law as to whether the State is program-
matically breaching Montana’s made-whole laws” by subrogating without
making made-whole determinations.179  There is nothing, however, in the
Diaz opinion that indicates that the Montana Supreme Court considered and
rejected the Wal-Mart majority’s new commonality analysis.  Briefing on
the case was completed before the Wal-Mart decision was handed down, so
none of the parties called the new test to the Court’s attention.  It seems far
more likely that the Diaz commonality analysis is simply a carry-over from
Cir. 1983).  Almost every federal court of appeals has required that Rule 23(b)(2) classes be “cohesive,”
which in many ways mimics Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. See e.g. Barnes v. Am. To-
bacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1988) (it is “well established that the class claims must be
cohesive”); Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2007) (certification of a
Rule 23(b)(2) class should be denied if “individualized issues . . . overwhelm class cohesiveness”); In re
St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121–1122 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Because ‘unnamed members are bound
by the action without the opportunity to opt out’ of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, even greater cohesiveness
generally is required than in a Rule 23(b)(3) class.”).
177. Diaz, 267 P.3d at 765.
178. Id. at 763 (quoting Ferguson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 180 P.3d 1164, 1169 (Mont. 2008)).
179. Id. at 763–764.
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pre-Wal-Mart caselaw, and not a reasoned decision to either reject or adopt
the Wal-Mart majority’s holding.
Montana courts should follow the Wal-Mart majority’s holding regard-
ing commonality.  Rule 23(a) is titled “Prerequisites.”  Requiring a question
of law or fact common to the class as a prerequisite for class treatment
makes sense because, at bottom, the purpose of Rule 23 is to determine
whether a case may be tried on a representative basis for the defined class.
If a proposed “common question” is not capable of being answered on a
class-wide basis, or if answering the question will not significantly advance
the ultimate resolution of the litigation, such a question should not satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the typicality
and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule
23(a)(4) tend to merge because both look to potential conflicts and to
“whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated
that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately pro-
tected in their absence.”180  The Court has also recognized that Rule 23(a)’s
requirements, taken as a whole, “effectively ‘limit the class claims to those
fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.’”181  The analysis of
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement similarly should be interpreted to
provide assurances that a class trial is possible.
Thus, the question which is common to the class must have some im-
portance to the ultimate resolution of the litigation; otherwise, class treat-
ment of the common issue is not worth the time or expense.182  The Wal-
Mart dissent seems to recognize this by reading “questions” to mean “dis-
puted issues.”183  Second, the question must be capable of a class-wide an-
swer because, otherwise, a class trial will degenerate into individualized
determinations.  The Wal-Mart dissent implicitly acknowledges this point
when it says that the “question” must be one “the resolution of which will
advance the determination of the class members’ claims.”184  Determination
of class members’ claims can only be advanced if the proposed common
question of law or fact can be answered on a class-wide basis.
By focusing on the Wal-Mart’s majority quotation from a law review
article that stated that “[d]issimilarities within the proposed class are what
180. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 626 n. 20.
181. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of N.W., 446 U.S. at 330).
182. For example, it took 10 years for the class certification decision to wind its way through the
courts, lead plaintiffs’ counsel spent $7 million in pursuit of class certification. See Leigh Jones, U.S.
Law Firm Spent $7 Million to Sue Wal-Mart, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/21/us-walmart-id
USTRE75K77C20110621 (June 21, 2011).
183. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2562 n. 3 (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 2562 (emphasis added).
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have the potential to impede the generation of common answers,”185 the
dissent argued, that “no mission remains for Rule 23(b)(3).”186  But this is
not so.  The Wal-Mart majority did not hold or state that the existence of
“dissimilarities” invariably precluded the existence of a question of law or
fact common to the class for Rule 23(a)(2) purposes; it merely quoted, with
approval, the observation that “dissimilarities . . . have the potential to im-
pede the generation of common answers.”187  In other words, “dissimilari-
ties” should be considered in analyzing whether a question of law or fact
can truly be answered on a class-wide basis.  This makes sense because, if a
proposed common question produces “dissimilar” answers, it cannot result
in a determination that “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.”188
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance inquiry requires more, as it is designed
to test “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adju-
dication by representation.”189  While there may be one question of law or
fact common to the class that is capable of being answered on a class-wide
basis, the existence of substantial non-common questions necessary to re-
solve absent class members’ claims may counsel against certification be-
cause those questions could swamp a class trial.190  While determining
whether there are dissimilarities within the proposed class may inform both
185. Id. at 2551 (majority) (quoting Nagareda, supra n. 117, at 132).
186. Id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
187. Id. at 2551 (majority) (emphasis added) (quoting Nagareda, supra n. 117, at 132).
188. Id.
189. Amchem Prods. Inc., 521 U.S. at 623.
190. For example, courts have routinely refused to certify classes alleging underpayment of insur-
ance claims arising from hurricanes because the individualized determinations necessary to show that
each insurance claim was underpaid would dwarf any common questions. See e.g. Franceschini v.
Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., No. 6:06–cv–1283–Orl–31JGG (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2007) (denying class
certification of class of insureds whose claims were adjusted using Integriclaim because “[e]ach class
member would have to present evidence of hurricane damage to their property, the value of the loss,
their communications with Allstate regarding this loss, and the payment, if any, received by Allstate.”);
Aguilar v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06–4660, slip op. at 3 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2007) (motion to strike
class allegations granted; allegations that defendant had underpaid claims by repeatedly utilizing below
market unit pricing could not be proven on a class-wide basis because “demonstrating a wrongful pat-
tern and practice of failing to adjust claims will require an intensive review of the individual facts of
each class member’s damage claim, including the nature and extent of damage, the timing and adjust-
ment of each class member’s claim, how much each class member was paid for his claim and for what
damage, and whether that amount was sufficient and timely.”); Henry v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 07–1738,
slip op. at 4 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2007) (striking class allegations and fraud claim regarding the use of
Integriclaim, because “proving a questionable pattern and practice of undervaluing claims will require
an intensive review of the individualized facts of each class member’s damage claim.”); Melancon v. St.
Farm Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4691685 at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2008) (denying class certification of case
alleging underpayment of insurance claims in part because inquiring into whether total amount paid was
sufficient was an individualized inquiry); Jones v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., No. 06–1407, slip op. at 4
(W.D. La. Nov. 3, 2006) (dismissing class allegations because individual inquiries required to determine
underpayment).
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the “common question” and “predominance” inquiries, such dissimilarities
are analyzed for different purposes.  For Rule 23(a)(2), the analysis focuses
on whether there are any questions common to the class that are “central to
the validity of each one of the claims” that are capable of being answered
on a class-wide basis.191  For Rule 23(b)(3), the analysis focuses on whether
such a common question “predominates” in the sense that it makes sense to
try the case on a class-wide basis.
Nor does asking whether individual differences impede common adju-
dication duplicate Rule 23(b)(3)’s “superiority” requirement, as the dissent
claimed.  Rule 23(b)(3)’s “superiority” inquiry looks to questions about
whether a class trial is practical and a wise use of judicial resources, going
well beyond the existence of dissimilarities.192
The Montana Supreme Court’s adoption of the Wal-Mart majority’s
commonality holding would likely overturn the Montana Supreme Court’s
holdings that Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied if there is a “common core of salient
facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.”193  The notion
that the existence of a “common core of salient facts” was sufficient to
satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) first crept into Montana jurisprudence in the Court’s
decision in Sieglock v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company.194
In Sieglock, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”)
published a list of names of the top 300 overtime wage earners in its track
department.195  The list included personal information about these employ-
ees, including their city and state of residence and their Social Security
numbers.196  Several BNSF employees filed a class action suit claiming
damages resulting from the release and circulation of the list.197  The dis-
trict court denied class certification in part because there were no common
questions of law, as the law of 23 different states would apply to the claims
of class members located in various states.198  The Montana Supreme Court
stated that “[t]he requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) are disjunctive, therefore
the party seeking [certification] must have either common questions of law
or fact.”199  It appeared that the district court had not “considered whether
the plaintiffs shared a common core of salient facts, irrespective of its deci-
191. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
192. See e.g. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 164 (superiority, which includes manageability analysis, encom-
passes the “whole range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for a
particular suit.”).
193. Sieglock, 81 P.3d at 498 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019); see also Ferguson, 180 P.3d at
1168–1169.
194. Sieglock, 81 P.3d 495.
195. Id. at 496.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 497.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 498.
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sion that there was no commonality of law.”200  The Court therefore re-
versed and remanded the matter for the district court’s consideration of
whether there was a common core of salient facts that would satisfy Rule
23(a)(2).201
The source of the Sieglock Court’s “common core of salient facts”
criterion was the Ninth Circuit decision, Hanlon v. Chrysler Corporation, a
decision affirming the approval of a settlement class of owners of minivans
with defective liftgates.202  The Montana Supreme Court quoted with ap-
proval from the Hanlon decision for the proposition that “commonality will
also be satisfied when there is a ‘common core of salient facts coupled with
disparate legal remedies within the class.’”203  The Hanlon opinion ex-
pressly followed the “permissive” construction of Rule 23(a)(2) that had
existed prior to Wal-Mart.204  The Ninth Circuit did not cite a single federal
precedent supporting the proposition that “a common core of salient facts”
satisfied Rule 23(a)(2).  It found commonality satisfied in that case because
the class claims “stem from the same source: the allegedly defective de-
signed rear liftgate latch installed in minivans manufactured by Chrysler
between 1984 and 1995.”205  But this conclusion could be re-stated from
the Wal-Mart perspective as follows: there was a common question of fact
(Were the liftgate latches defectively designed?) that apparently could be
answered on a class-wide basis (e.g., it was a design defect common to all
vehicles, since they were all manufactured to the same specifications).
Thus, properly understood, Hanlon does not support the existence of a
separate “common core of salient facts” test for satisfying Rule 23(a)(2)’s
requirement, and that line of analysis should be abandoned under Montana
law. Wal-Mart teaches that whether there is a “common core of salient
facts” among class members is irrelevant.  The correct inquiry is whether
there is a question of fact (or law) common to the class that is “capable of
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims
in one stroke.”206  That is the test that should be adopted by the Montana
Supreme Court.
200. Sieglock, 81 P.3d at 499.
201. Id.
202. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019.
203. Sieglock, 81 P.3d at 498 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019).
204. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 (“The commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous
than the companion requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).  Indeed, Rule 23(a)(2) has been construed permis-
sively.”).
205. Id. at 1019–1020.
206. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
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c. Lesson 3: Rule 23(b)(2) Does Not Authorize Certification of All
Equitable Claims and Cannot Be Used as a Vehicle for the
Recovery of Individualized Monetary Awards
1. The Status of the Pre-Wal-Mart Law
Both federal and Montana Rule 23(b)(2) provide that a class action
may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and “the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,
so the final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropri-
ate respecting the class as a whole.”207  A Rule 23(b)(2) class is referred to
as “mandatory class” because once certified, no notice is required to be sent
to the class members, nor are class members permitted to “opt out” of the
class.208  This derives from the “indivisible nature of the injunctive or de-
claratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can
be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to
none.”209  By contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) permits class certification if Rule
23(a) has been satisfied and “the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”210
The United States Supreme Court had previously explained that Rule
23(b)(2) was designed to permit “class actions for declaratory or injunctive
relief,” whereas “Rule 23(b)(3) added to the complex-litigation arsenal class
actions for damages . . . .”211  The Court had also expressed serious doubt
that class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) would be appropriate when
monetary relief is sought.212  However, in the absence of definitive Su-
preme Court guidance, lower courts had permitted certain judicial glosses to
be placed upon Rule 23(b)(2).
Some courts had assumed that notwithstanding Rule 23(b)(2)’s explicit
reference to injunctive or declaratory relief, certification of classes for other
forms of “equitable” relief, such as disgorgement or unjust enrichment, was
207. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
208. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
209. Nagareda, supra n. 117, at 132.
210. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  Under both rules, in determining whether a
class action is a superior method, the court is to consider: “(A) the class members’ interests in individu-
ally controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesir-
ability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties
in managing a class action.”
211. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 614.
212. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994).
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permissible.213  Several courts (including the Wal-Mart district court and en
banc Ninth Circuit majority) had justified certifying back-pay classes, at
least in part, because back pay “is recoverable as an equitable, make-whole
remedy in employment class actions notwithstanding its monetary na-
ture.”214  Before the Supreme Court, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs argued that
their back pay claims were appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) treatment because
a back pay award is “equitable in nature.”215
Another judicially created gloss on Rule 23(b)(2) had developed based
upon the Advisory Committee Note to the Rule that a 23(b)(2) class “does
not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively
or predominately to money damages.”216  Seizing upon that language, some
federal circuit courts of appeal, like the pre-Wal-Mart Ninth Circuit, had
adopted a test to determine whether monetary relief was predominately fo-
cused on plaintiffs’ subjective intent in bringing the lawsuit.  If the injunc-
tive or declaratory relief sought would have alone been sufficient to induce
plaintiffs to bring the suit, the fact that other monetary relief was sought
would not “predominate.”217  Other federal circuit courts of appeals had
developed an “incidental damages” standard, under which monetary relief
predominates over other forms of relief “unless it is incidental to requested
injunctive or declaratory relief.”218
Thus, notwithstanding Rule 23(b)(2)’s express language which limited
certification under that section to classes seeking final injunctive or declara-
tory relief, judicial authorization of Rule 23(b)(2) classes for “equitable”
monetary relief and “non-predominate” or “incidental” damages had crept
into federal class action precedent.
213. See e.g. Mehling v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 246 F.R.D. 467 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (approving class settle-
ment that included disgorgement of profits).  Not all lower courts had agreed that other forms of equita-
ble relief was permitted in a Rule 23(b)(2) class. See e.g. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assn., Inc. v.
New Prime, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 537, 545 (W.D. Mo. 2002) (denying certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for
disgorgement because it did not “qualify as injunctive relief” and “is not relief contemplated by Rule
23(b)(2).”); Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 212 F.R.D. 518, 522 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (denying
Rule 23(b)(2) certification for disgorgement because it was a monetary remedy, not injunctive or declar-
atory relief).
214. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 170 (citations omitted); see also Dukes, 603 F.3d at 618; (citations omit-
ted); But see Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2011) (the Seventh Circuit
rejected the notion that Rule 23(b)(2)’s “injunctive” relief should be read to mean all forms of “equita-
ble” monetary relief).
215. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.
216. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory comm. nn. to 1966 amends.; 39 F.R.D. 69, 102.
217. See e.g. Molski, 318 F.3d at 950.
218. See e.g. Allison v. Citigo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Randall,
637 F.3d at 825 (holding that monetary relief is “incidental” if it only requires a “mechanical computa-
tion” under the “clean-up” doctrine of equity).
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2. Rule 23(b)(2) Cannot be Used to Certify Classes for “Equitable”
Relief or for Individualized Monetary Awards
In Wal-Mart, the unanimous Court rejected the argument that Rule
23(b)(2) applies to all forms of equitable relief.  While back pay may be an
equitable remedy, the Court found that that fact was irrelevant.219  “The
Rule does not speak of ‘equitable’ remedies generally, but of injunctions
and declaratory judgments.  As Title VII makes pellucidly clear, back pay is
neither.”220  The unanimous Court thus made clear that it will also not
countenance “back-door” attempts to obtain monetary relief in a 23(b)(2)
class by characterizing such relief (e.g., “disgorgement” or “restitution”) as
“equitable” in nature.221
The unanimous Wal-Mart Court also held that claims for monetary
relief may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), “at least where (as here) the
monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief.”222
The Court recognized that “[o]ne possible reading [of Rule 23(b)(2)] is that
it applies only to requests for such injunctive or declaratory relief and does
not authorize the class certification of monetary claims at all.”223  But the
Court did not reach that broader question because it determined that “at a
minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here)
do not satisfy the Rule.”224  As the Court explained:
Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment
would provide relief to each member of the class.  It does not authorize class
certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a differ-
ent injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.  Similarly, it
does not authorize class certification when each class member would be enti-
tled to an individualized award of monetary damages.225
Combining individualized and class-wide relief under Rule 23(b)(2)
was also contrary to the structure of Rule 23(b).  Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes are “mandatory classes” with no notice or opt-out required because
of the class-wide nature of the relief sought.226  Rule 23(b)(3) “allows class
certification in a much wider set of circumstances but with greater procedu-
219. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2560.
220. Id.
221. Other courts had previously rejected attempts to certify 23(b)(2) classes for “disgorgement” or
“restitution” using a similar analysis. See e.g. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Assn., Inc., 213 F.R.D. at
545 (denying 23(b)(2) certification of a class seeking “disgorgement” of profits); Casson, 212 F.R.D. at
521 (denying 23(b)(2) certification of a class seeking “disgorgement” of profits); Thorn v. Jefferson-
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 331 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying 23(b)(2) certification of a class seeking
“restitution”).
222. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 2558.
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ral protections” for absent class members, including the “predominance”
and “superiority” requirements, notice, and a right to opt-out of the class if
they desire.227  The Court noted that “[g]iven that structure, we think it
clear that individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”  As the
Court explained:
The procedural protections attending the (b)(3) class . . . are missing from
(b)(2) not because the Rule considers them unnecessary, but because it con-
siders them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class.  When a class seeks an indivisible
injunction benefiting all its members at once, there is no reason to undertake a
case-specific inquiry into whether class issues predominate or whether class
action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute. . . .  But with respect
to each class member’s individualized claim for money, that is not so—which
is precisely why (b)(3) requires the judge to make findings about predomi-
nance and superiority . . . .228
The Court observed that it had previously held that in a class action
predominately seeking monetary relief, the absence of notice and opt-out
violates due process.229  “While we have never held that to be so where the
monetary claims do not predominate, the serious possibility that it may be
so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the
monetary claims here.”230
Although the Court expressly declined to hold that there was no cir-
cumstance under which monetary claims could be certified under Rule
23(b)(2), there are several indications in the unanimous portion of the
Court’s opinion that suggest that it would so rule if presented squarely with
the question.  The Court expressly rejected the respondents’ argument that
the “negative implication” from the Advisory Committee note is that a
(b)(2) class “does extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief re-
lates only partially or nonpredominately [sic] to money damages” because
“it is the Rule itself, not the Advisory Committee’s description of it, that
governs.  And a mere negative inference does not in our view suffice to
establish a disposition that has no basis in the Rule’s text and that does
obvious violence to the Rule’s structural features.”231  In language that
would seem to foreshadow the rejection of any predominance test, the
Court declared “[w]e fail to see why the Rule should be read to nullify [the
protections of Rule 23(b)(3)] whenever a plaintiff class, at its option, com-
bines its monetary claims with a request—even a ‘predominating re-
quest’—for an injunction.”232  Indeed, the Court noted that a “predomi-
227. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring “the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances” and a right to withdraw from the class).
228. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558–2259 (emphasis in original).
229. Id. at 2559; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
230. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
231. Id. (emphasis in original).
232. Id.
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nance” test would create “perverse incentives” for class representatives (or
their counsel) to “place at risk potentially valid claims for monetary relief”
in order to make it more likely that monetary relief would not
“predominate.”233
3. The Montana Supreme Court Should Follow Wal-Mart’s Rejection of
Certifying Rule 23(b)(2) Classes for Generally “Equitable” or
Monetary Relief
Prior to Wal-Mart, the Montana Supreme Court had not been con-
fronted with a case that certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class for “equitable relief”
that was not declaratory or injunctive relief.  However, Montana should
adopt the unanimous Wal-Mart Court’s position that Rule 23(b)(2) is lim-
ited to declaratory or injunctive relief. Wal-Mart’s construction of Rule
23(b)(2) according to its plain meaning comports with long-standing princi-
ples of statutory construction.  When the terms of a statute or rule are clear
and unambiguous, a court’s function is to “enforc[e] the terms of the statute
as Congress has drafted it.”234  Rule 23(b)(2) speaks in terms of injunctive
and declaratory relief, which are equitable remedies.  But as the Fourth Cir-
cuit noted in a pre-Wal-Mart decision, “if the Rule’s drafters had intended
the Rule to extend to all forms of equitable relief, the text of the Rule would
say so.”235  Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one excludes others), a court should not
read into Rule 23(b)(2) all equitable remedies when the language of the rule
includes only declaratory and injunctive relief.236  Montana follows similar
rules of statutory consideration and thus should adopt this Wal-Mart hold-
ing.237
Prior to Wal-Mart, the Montana Supreme Court has not been called
upon to address whether claims involving monetary relief can be certified
under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), or if so, under what cir-
cumstances.  The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Ferguson v. Safeco
233. Id.
234. Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communs. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991) (applying the plain meaning rule to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11).
235. Thorn, 445 F.3d at 331.
236. See e.g. Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993) (applying maxim to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
237. See e.g. Shelby Distributors, LLC v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 206 P.3d 899, 902 (Mont. 2009)
(“We first attempt to construe a statute according to its plain meaning.  If the language of the statute is
unambiguous, no further interpretation is necessary.”); Dukes v. City of Missoula, 119 P.3d 61, 64–65
(Mont. 2005) (applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine to enforcement of the Montana
Scaffold Act).
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Insurance Company238 could be misunderstood as a case involving a Rule
23(b)(2) class that permitted the award of a class-wide disgorgement award.
In fact, it did not.  In Ferguson, a putative class sought a judicial declaration
that Safeco had “breached its insurance contract and adjustment duties by a
programmatic assertion of subrogation without first investigating and deter-
mining whether the insureds ha[d] received their ‘made whole’ rights.”239
The putative class also sought injunctive relief compelling the return of
subrogation amounts previously recovered by Safeco to their source (not
the class) until complying with the “made whole” standard.240  No mone-
tary relief going to the class was sought.
The Montana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Montana
Power Company,241 which reversed a district court’s refusal to certify a
punitive damage class, could also be misinterpreted to sanction monetary
relief in a (b)(2) action because the opinion does not recite under what sub-
section of the rule certification was sought.  However, review of the district
court certification order clearly confirms that the certification in question
was under Rules 23(b)(1) and (3), and not Rule 23(b)(2).242
In Diaz,243 the Montana Supreme Court’s first class certification deci-
sion citing Wal-Mart, the Court appeared to adopt Wal-Mart’s holding that
cases requiring individualized awards of monetary damages are not appro-
priate in Rule 23(b)(2) actions, but whether the holding was properly ap-
plied is open to question.  The Diaz Court recognized that, under Wal-Mart,
Rule 23(b)(2) “does not authorize class certification when each class mem-
ber would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages, or
when each class member would be entitled to a different injunction or de-
claratory judgment against the defendant.”244  The Diaz Court quoted with
approval Wal-Mart’s explanation that “‘[t]he key to the [Rule 23(b)(2)]
class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy war-
ranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or de-
clared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of
them.’”245
The Montana Supreme Court found that, just as in Ferguson, the Diaz
class was certifiable under Rule 23(b)(2) because a single question affects
238. Ferguson, 180 P.3d 1164.
239. Id. at 390–391.
240. Id. at 1170.
241. Gonzalez v. Mont. Power Co., 233 P.3d 328 (Mont. 2010).
242. See Or. Granting Certification of Class Action Except for Fraud and Granting Leave to File
Sixth Amend. Compl., Gonzalez v. Mont. Power Co., Cause No. DV–98–253 (Mont. 2d Jud. Dist. Oct. 2,
2009).
243. Diaz, 267 P.3d 756.
244. Id. at 765 (emphasis in original).
245. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557).
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all class members: “Can the State, in compliance with the subrogation laws,
programmatically exercise [subrogation] before conducting a made-whole
analysis?”246  The Diaz Court reasoned that, like Ferguson, “[a]ny individu-
alized determinations regarding whether class members have been made
whole will not occur in the context of this class action claim.”247
But in an apparent effort to comply with the Wal-Mart holding re-
jecting individualized monetary awards, the Diaz Court appears to have
misunderstood the Diaz record.  As Justice Rice’s dissent points out, the
Diaz plaintiffs’ pleadings did “not challenge the State’s internal mechanism
for applying the made whole doctrine.  Rather it is the Plaintiffs’ claim,
repeatedly stated, that the State has ‘illegally withheld’ benefits, should be
made to calculate the amount withheld for ‘each member of the class,’
should ‘immediately pay’ such benefits plus interest, and should pay puni-
tive damages.”248  The Diaz complaint specifically sought “a declaratory
judgment that the [State’s] withholding of benefits violates the ‘made
whole’ law.”249  The complaint also sought orders “requiring the [State] to
calculate the amounts they have unlawfully withheld and to pay those
amounts to the plaintiffs,” as well as “all other damages allowed by Mon-
tana law.”250  Thus, as Justice Rice pointed out in his dissent, the Diaz
case—at least as pleaded—did seek individualized monetary awards that
Wal-Mart held were inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification.
The Diaz Court’s reliance on Ferguson is also arguably misplaced.
The Diaz Court characterized the Ferguson case as seeking “an injunction
requiring the insurer to return to her any amounts it had illegally subrogated
until it completed the requisite made-whole adjustments.”251  In fact, Fer-
guson involved Safeco’s alleged improper collection of subrogated amounts
from third parties;252 the plaintiff requested in addition to class-wide declar-
atory relief, an “injunctive order compelling the return of subrogation
amounts until such time as adjustments under the ‘made-whole’ standard
had been completed by Safeco.”253  The “return” of such subrogated
amounts was to the source from which the amounts had been received (i.e.,
246. Id. at 765.
247. Id. at 766.
248. Id. at 769 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
249. Diaz, 267 P.3d at 769.
250. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
251. Id. at 766 (majority) (emphasis added).
252. Ferguson, 180 P.3d at 1165–1166; Appellants’ Br., 25, Ferguson, 180 P.3d 1164 (“Safeco’s
program recovers subrogation . . . by asserting and collecting subrogation directly from third-party
insurers without any analysis of whether Safeco’s insured has been made-whole.”).
253. Ferguson, 180 P.3d at 1170 (emphasis added).
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third-party insurers), not a return to the plaintiff or the class.254  In Fergu-
son, unlike Diaz, individualized “make whole” awards were never
sought.255
It therefore appears that while the Montana Supreme Court has sig-
naled a willingness to adopt the Wal-Mart holding that individualized mon-
etary awards are not appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification, the applica-
tion of this holding will require greater attention in future cases.  Rather
than ignore requested monetary relief and recast a case into one never
pleaded, the proper course of action is to recognize that class certification
should be denied in such cases, and Rule 23(b)(2) certification should be
restricted to cases actually seeking only final declaratory or injunctive re-
lief.
d. Lesson 4: Class Certification Cannot Be Used to Strip a Defendant
of Its Right to Litigate Its Defense to
Individual Monetary Claims
1. The Status of Pre-Wal-Mart Law
Before the Wal-Mart decision, some courts confronting difficulties in
determining precisely which Title VII claimants in a Rule 23(b)(2) class
would have been given a better job absent discrimination resorted to a for-
mulaic approach to calculate a lump sum amount that represented the em-
ployer’s total back pay to the class.256  As the Ninth Circuit put it, “‘[w]hen
the class size or the ambiguity of promotion or hiring practices or the illegal
practices continued over an extended period of time calls forth [a] quagmire
of hypothetical judgment . . . a class-wide approach to the measure of back-
pay is necessitated.’”257  In such cases, courts had recognized that it was
“not a choice between one approach more precise than another.  Any
method is simply a process of conjectures.”258
254. This is confirmed from review of the plaintiff’s briefs before the Montana Supreme Court. See
br. of Appellants at 26–27, Ferguson, 180 P.3d 1164; Br. of Appellants at 6–7, Ferguson, 180 P.3d
1164.
255. Class relief prayed for in Ferguson included punitive damages, (see Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶
14), but that was not a claim upon which plaintiffs sought certification.  The propriety of certification of
a Rule 23(b)(2) punitive damage class is all but foreclosed by the Wal-Mart decision.
256. See e.g. EEOC v. O & G Spring & Wire Forms Spec. Co., 38 F.3d 872, 879–880 n. 9 (7th Cir.
1994) (approving district court’s use of formula approach); Hameed v. Int’l Assn. of Bridge Workers,
Loc. 396, 637 F.2d 506, 520–521 n. 18 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing cases approving formula approach to
class-wide damages); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452–453 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing cases
approving formula approach to class-wide damages); EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 668 F.
Supp. 1150, 1151–1152 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
257. Domingo v. New Eng. Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1444 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Pettway v. Am.
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261 (5th Cir. 1974)).
258. Pettway, 494 F.2d at 261.
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In such cases, once a formula was employed to calculate a lump sum
back pay award to the class, the additional steps of determining which class
members would be eligible to share in the award and in what amount was
required.  Awarding back pay to all potential victims of discrimination has
the effect of generating a “windfall for some employees who would have
never been promoted” even absent discrimination and “undercompen-
sat[ing] the genuine victims of discrimination by forcing them to share the
award with their undeserving brethren.”259  Such “rough justice” was “bet-
ter than the alternative of no remedy at all for any class member.”260  How-
ever, no federal appellate court (other than the en banc Ninth Circuit major-
ity) had approved of the use of a formula in a Title VII case where the
defendant objected to such approach.
Formulaic approaches to class-wide recoveries were not unique to the
Title VII arena, nor to Rule 23(b)(2) classes.  As discussed above, the Ninth
Circuit en banc majority cited the Hilao261 decision as an example of the
proper use of a formula-type approach to class-wide damage calculations,
and Hilao was a Rule 23(b)(3) class.  Class-wide damage calculations based
upon formulas or the trial of random sample claims had been approved in
mass tort Rule 23(b)(3) actions as well.262  In each instance, courts justified
such approaches because the realities of litigating thousands of individual
damage claims on a claim-by-claim basis would be essentially impossible
as a practical matter.263
2. The Unanimous Wal-Mart Court’s Rejection of “Trial by Formula”
In its analysis of why the monetary claims for back pay were not suita-
ble for Rule 23(b)(2) certification, the Wal-Mart Court recognized:
[A] class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled
to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.  And because the neces-
sity of that litigation will prevent backpay from being “incidental” to the
classwide injunction, [the] class could not be certified even assuming, argu-
endo, that “incidental” monetary relief can be awarded to a Rule 23(b)(2)
class.264
259. Stewart, 542 F.2d at 452–453.
260. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 177.
261. Hilao, 103 F.3d 767.
262. See e.g. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 659–667 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (adopting
a sampling approach in mass asbestos Rule 23(b)(3) class action); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Resolv-
ing Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 89 (1989).
263. See e.g. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652 (“If the Court could somehow close thirty cases a month, it
would take six and one-half years to try these cases and there would be pending over 5,000 untouched
cases at the present rate of filing.  Transaction costs would be astronomical.”).
264. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
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In reaching this conclusion, the unanimous Court expressly rejected
the notion that class-wide back pay could be awarded based upon a “Trial
by Formula,” a concept embraced by the Ninth Circuit en banc majority.265
With regard to the random sampling approach of Hilao, the Court specifi-
cally disapproved of such a “novel project.”266  Such an approach ran afoul
of the Rules Enabling Act, which “forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.’”267  To comply with the Rules
Enabling Act, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may affect “only the pro-
cess of enforcing litigants’ rights and not the rights themselves.”268  This
requirement tracks the United States Constitution’s separation of powers,
and a broader delegation of power to the judiciary to make or modify sub-
stantive rights would constitute an improper delegation of legislative au-
thority, which constitutionally is within the exclusive purview of Con-
gress.269  Wal-Mart’s right to litigate its statutory defense to individual
claims thus could not be abrogated by the procedural device of awarding
class-wide damages based upon formulas or sampling.
3. Montana Should Also Reject Formulaic Class-Wide Damages
Approaches
The same concerns that drove the unanimous Wal-Mart Court to reject
“Trial by Formula” in federal class actions applies with equal force to Mon-
tana class action law.  Although Montana does not have an exact analog to
the Rules Enabling Act, the Montana Constitution, like the United States
Constitution, requires separation of powers.  Article III of the Montana
Constitution directs that the state’s governmental power is divided into
three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.  That Article
provides that “[n]o person or persons charged with the exercise of power
properly belonging to one branch shall exercise any power properly belong-
ing to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed
or permitted.”270  Article VII of the Constitution clearly limits the Montana
Supreme Court’s rule making powers to, inter alia, “practice and procedure
for all other courts.”271
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
268. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987).
269. See e.g. I.N.S v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
270. Mont. Const. art. III, § 1.
271. Id. at art. VII, § 2(3) (“It may make rules governing appellate procedure, practice and procedure
for all other courts, admission to the bar and the conduct of its members.  Rules of procedure shall be
subject to disapproval by the legislature in either of the two sessions following promulgation.”).  The
language of this rule is substantively similar to language originally proposed by the minority report to
the Montana Constitutional Convention.  The minority report noted that “[t]he second class of rule-
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The promulgation of Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court was thus not intended to abridge or enlarge substantive
legal rights, and as a Constitutional matter, could not do so.  This necessa-
rily means that class-wide damages approaches, whether based upon formu-
las or random sampling, should be rejected in Montana if the use of such
devices would frustrate a defendant’s right to raise individual common law
or statutory defenses to class member’s claims.  Such a result is also com-
pelled by the Montana Constitution’s guarantee that no citizen will be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without Due Process of law.272  A defen-
dant’s Due Process right to challenge individual class members’ entitlement
to monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief cannot be abrogated by the pro-
cedural device of class certification.  As the Montana Supreme Court has
recognized, Due Process requires that a defendant be afforded “an opportu-
nity to present every available defense.”273
V. CONCLUSION
Class actions are an exception to the general rule that a lawsuit only
determines the rights of the parties before the Court.274  In Montana, this
exception is permitted “only if” all of the requirements of Montana Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 are met.275  Because the Montana rule is identical to
Federal Rule 23(a) and (b), the Wal-Mart decision’s lessons should be
adopted and applied in the continuing development of Montana class-action
law.  District courts in Montana should be required to “find” or “determine”
that each of Rule 23’s requirements have been proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, even if that means addressing and resolving an issue that
will have to be proven again at a trial on the merits.  Applying the Wal-
Mart majority’s clarification regarding determining commonality, class ac-
tions should not be certified if a common question capable of generating a
common answer for the entire class likely to drive resolution of the lawsuit
is absent.  Rule 23(b)(2) actions should be limited to claims for injunctive
or declaratory relief, and cannot be used for the recovery of individualized
monetary recovery.  Finally, formulaic approaches to class-wide damages
should be rejected if they impede a defendant’s right to individually chal-
lenge the right of class members to recover money damages.
making power is restricted to rules of procedure and is intended to include both civil and criminal codes,
but is specifically limited and qualified . . . meaning, of course, that the rule-making power is actually
reserved to the plenary power of the legislature as the lawmaking body of the State.”  Montana Constitu-
tional Convention Proceedings vol. I, 516 (Mont. Legis. & Legis. Council 1972).
272. Mont. Const. art. II, § 17.
273. Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561, 599 (Mont. 2007) (quoting Phillip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams,
127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007); see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972).
274. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
275. Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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